The building of a multiplex regional structure in Asia : Under the outlook of the relationship between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China

Introduction

Announced as the “Chinese era”, the 21st century is revealing the singular role endorsed by Asia as the new “center of gravity of world politics”[1].  Moved by the quest of leadership, a wide range of actors (States and economic conglomerates) is divided by resilient rivalries. Southeast Asia is greatly influenced by alien foreign policies due to its geographical position, namely the proximity of the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea. The first is one of the most essential global maritime route, since it directly connects the trade flows between the European consumption markets, the Asian factories and the Middle East energy suppliers. The second is involved in an international security issue: the territorial contentious around the disputed South China Sea’s archipelagos has lead to the redefinition of the regional security framework, and is oscillating now between the attempts of internationalising the conflict, the States polarization around military alliances, peaceful negotiations and multilateral cooperation. The Association of Southeast Asian nation (ASEAN) has consequently evolved into an “object of desire”, which is not limited to the strict geopolitical dimension since the region is appealed to become a significant consumption market[2], and therefore a source of profit for conglomerates.

The western foreign affairs literature depicts the continent as a battlefield for influences between major powers, such as China (PRC), Japan, India, and the today’s contested American naval power. It is worth noting that the western press exacerbates the idea of an immoderate Chinese expansionism, which tends to reduce the issue only to the military dimension. On the other side, China’s foreign affairs specialists blame the USA of leading an unjustified containment policy towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC) interests, while underlining the necessity of pursuing the conflict solving with non-military means.

The South China Sea issue constitutes a relevant way of measuring the power reconfiguration in Asia, as a “laboratory of the evolution between China and ASEAN”[3]. While both entities claim to be the “spearhead” of Asian integration, they strive to achieve regional leadership; which means, the guidance of the continental’s upcoming political and economic trends, in concordance with their perceived national and mutual interests. The upcoming trend will be strongly driven by the American foreign policy in Asia, whose accentuation in 2012 by the Obama Administration has forced China to adopt dissuasion policies and military programs towards the American forces. This could intensify the polarization within the region, as well as a conflict potentiality; the emergence of an American alliance system being often blamed for “making the region less rather than more stable”[4].

The author’s purpose in this study is to discuss the relationship between the Association of Southeast Asia (ASEAN) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under the prospect of their competing and mutual interests.  The case of the South China Sea maritime conflict reveals the ambiguity and complexity of their relationship, thus appealing the study to challenge the western warmonger vision of their relationship and consider the cooperative and peace building dimension. The incremental economic policies implemented in both sides, such as the ASEAN-China, combined with a private-led regional economic integration interconnectivity, as exemplified by the establishment of the ASEAN-China exclusive economic zone. Consequently, we strive to nuance all at once the limited vision of their indisputable antagonism, and erect prospects about the Asian integration project. The latter will be condemned, in all likelihood, to follow two potential trends, either an ASEAN political unification – also known as ASEAN centrality – or a Chinese-led economic integration in Asia[5]. The deep economic and political interdependence of the two parties erects a fundamental statement, namely that the Asian integration project is today unconceivable by excluding one of the two parties; this assumption induces that tomorrow’s Asia is more likely to redefine its socio-politic space into a multiplex structure of governance, instead of sinking into a hegemonic dominance framework. In this regard, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) proposed by China, – which strives to build a free-trade area with the ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand – appears as the upcoming Asian integration multiplex superstructure and as the potential spearhead of the continent’s rise.

In essence, the study assumes that ASEAN is evolving into a key player in the region as consequence of the relationship nurtured with China, and that the upcoming socio-political structure evolution in Asia will result from the combination of China’s policy, as well as ASEAN pursued goals. The latters can be divided into two parts, namely the political goal of achieving the ASEAN-centrality as mean to shape regional leadership, and the economic goal of developing the “largest factory of the world” [6] through transnational infrastructure and investment spending.

Map 1: ASEAN’s geopolitical structure[7]

 

Achieve ASEAN centrality

Historically transited by foreign interferences, the South East Asia region has been characterized by a resilient lack of diplomatic autonomy. The socio-political structures among the region’s countries have notably been shaped by the Chinese empire, the European colonial rule[8], and more recently by the performative effects of the bipolar confrontation between the World systems, respectively defended by the USA and the Soviet Union[9]. Resulting from the 1945 Yalta agreement, the western and soviet interested parties – none of the Asian countries was represented – laid the groundwork of todays Asian divisions, by weakening and abandoning South East Asia to foreign interest[10]. The absence of a regional benevolent power, role endorsed since centuries by the Qing Empire (according to the sino-centric international relations perspective), enabled the rearrangement of influence spheres. In this chapter, we aim to enlighten the ASEAN genesis during the Cold War context, as well as the following attempt to build the ASEAN centrality as a political objective of empowerment towards major powers interferences.

 

 A longstanding fragmentation

The Qing dynasty that reigned over China for more than two centuries exerted an indirect domination over Asian countries[11], considered as vassal States in accordance with China’s concentric world conception.  The latter results from the “sino-centrism” conception of the international relations, which advocates the universal dominance and superiority of China’s institutions, culture and emperor. Indeed, the emperor was recognized the right to govern the World in compliance with the celestial and divine essence of his power. Sinocentrism shaped Asia’s foreign policy for centuries, under a complex articulation between vassalage structures – through tribute payments  – and the absence of a formal imperial control instrument[12], guiding the continental’s current economic affairs through the long-established presence of numerous Chinese merchants, partially and informally controlling the productive sectors among South East Asian countries[13]. The Chinese Empire collapse in 1911 concretized the power fragmentation and the symbolical disappearance of Asia’s long established hegemon, which was in reality a resilient process that had began during the second half of the nineteenth century, through civil wars – the major killer Taiping rebellion – and foreign immiscibility from the European imperialist countries and Japan, which resulted in a sovereignty shift that would divide the continent for a century.

 

 The ASEAN security community

Established in 1967 as result of the Bangkok Declaration, the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations embodied the first collective affirmation of the Asian identity. Originally signed by Thailand, Suharto’s Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia, the founding members had very little in common, except a shared experience of the Japanese occupation during the Second World War[14]. Motivated by securing long-term peace in the region, the ASEAN can be framed as a security community, which according to Adler and Barnett corresponds to “a transnational region composed by sovereign States, and whose people has reasonable expectations regarding a pacific transition”[15]. In effect, the spread of communist socio-politic forms in Asia had reached a climax in 1975^[16], through the Vietnam War termination and the Viêt Minh victory, combined with the power seizures by anti-American political entities in Cambodia and Laos – the Paht Lao and Khmer Rouge regimes. This power shifts raised concerns about a potential widespread of conflicts in the neighboring countries, thus resulting in a perceived regional high instability, and thus in uncertainty for the upcoming political trends among the continent.

The ASEAN building up has been absent of the political competing playfield, as the institutional framing has been monopolized by politico-administrative actors at the governmental intern level, which allegedly transposed their anti-communist beliefs into the ASEAN implementation^[17]. The organization genesis reveals to be closely aligned with the American containment policy, foreign policy doctrine disposed to prevent the “domino effect”^[18] and impeach the communist widespread in Asia, which we could relate to the international relations concept of balancing. According to Hans Morgenthau, balancing is a self-regulating behaviour of the State’s foreign policy, whose alliance is enacted in response to a major power’s threat.

The American world order strived to enact a competitor’s model towards the communist liberation and anticolonial ideology, which were perceived by numerous scholars as the first Asian integration project breeding grounds. Indeed, numerous alternative political projects flourished in the so-called emerging countries, some were even proposing the replacement of the United Nations, accused of representing the US world order, but unanimously advocating the emerging countries autonomy. As relevant example, Indonesia’s socialist president Sukharno, closely allied with Mao Zedong, advocated in 1965 the constitution of an axis « Jakarta – Hanoi – Pyongyang – Beijing » while internationally promoting the non-alignment movement and China’s leadership in the region[19].  Under this outlook, a new vision of the Asian construction erected, namely the idea of an anti-imperialist and internationalist union of nations, against which the ASEAN was institutionalized under American benevolentia. While Indonesia from anticommunist president Suharto had broke diplomatic relations with China in 1967^[20], Singapore served as US-navy supply port^[21] and Thailand as the biggest US-air force base^[22] during the Vietnam War. Despite an effective support from the PRC, this new affirmed communist states never built an effective anti-capitalist alliance due to competing interests for the region’s leadership, notably between Vietnam, China and Cambodia. In all likelihood, the dissensions between the communists States prevented the ASEAN in building an unified organ – like the NATO – with the capabilities of ensuring the regional security, because the danger perception decreased and was not requiring any further sovereignty transfer to the security community. Instead of, the ASEAN security network seems to have been essentially established on two basis, namely the security value compatibility and the mutual predictability of the non military means use[23].

 

 ASEAN centrality

During the nineties, the so-claimed socialist Southeast Asian States successfully joined the association, therefore concluding with the binary opposition period resulting from the Cold War and alleviating the security requirement, while bringing political stabilization among the region. The adhesion of Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia stimulated the gradual increase of interdependence and homogenization, and especially shifted momentarily the priority for security issues and opened new fields of opportunity, notably the political and economic integration. However, while granting the association with international visibility, an increased regional stability and an enhanced market, the ASEAN expansion also caused a binary fragmentation between the founder states and the newcomers, which would paralyse the decisional processes during the conflict solving summits. While the five original maritime States were eager to stimulate trade, open new markets and pursue a deeper regional integration, the arriving continental States were characterised by political authoritarianism and economical poverty, and were thus seeking to obtain financial aids, like ODA loans (Official Development Assistance), investment and infrastructures[24].  Nevertheless, the following years revealed the development of closer ties between the ASEAN members[25].

The concept of ASEAN centrality has been advocated through the ASEAN Charta adoption in 2007[26], and expresses the association’s ambition to endorse leadership in Asia’s “regional architecture, and by its role as the main node in dense and overlapping regional networks connecting multiple stakeholders in the region”^[27]. Willing to exert a performative effect over the Asian regional structure and co-regional relationships, the ASEAN is facing many challenges that contest its legitimacy as “driving force” in the continent. ASEAN centrality is today challenged by internal disunions[28] and by the competition for the southeast region between major powers, such as the USA, China and Japan, whose presence in the region compromises the erection of an ASEAN autonomous common foreign policy[29]. Indeed, the endorsement of further competences depends on growing pressures catalyzing a “fast-changing political-security setting”[30].  The future legitimacy of the ASEAN as active and performative player in Asia will depend on the association’s problem solving ability, constrained to deal with limited capabilities and institutional prerogatives.

 

 The ASEAN way Limits

Since the years following the organization creation, the mode of decisions among the ASEAN remains consensual and faithful to the principle of « non interference in state’s sovereign affairs »[31], which implies that the consent of all member-states is required before approving mutual policies. This decisional mode, known in this specific case as the “ASEAN way”, is usually developed when a group of state perceives the interest in solving a problem through a collective organ, rather than by individual state-centeredness. Let us remind ourselves that the ASEAN was an institutional answer to the regional instability during the seventies, as an attempt to lay the foundations of a security community, but divergent national preferences[32] and a decreasing danger perception impeached the emergence of a centralized and supranational decisional mod.  The “ASEAN Way”, despite it’s theoretical lack of efficiency, has shown the ability of transcend national divergences – until some extent – by preventing and solving some emerging conflicts[33].  The major success of the ASEAN diplomacy is undoubtedly the formulation of an unified response – joint decision – to the invasion of Cambodia in 1979[34] by Vietnam. Globally, the association has been praised for having achieved stability in Southeast Asia “without the overt need for hegemony”[35].

The success of ASEAN joint statement before the nineties expansion could be explained simultaneously by the relative similarities between the member states foreign policy agendas, impregnated by maritime considerations[36], and by the high absence of trust among major powers during the Cold War period. The ASEAN was not more efficient or powerful than it is nowadays, but it notably served as negotiation hub as result of the “default in trust”[37] and was therefore perceived as an acceptable conciliator. After the expansion period, the “ASEAN way” remained the principal modus operandi, convergent with the “region’s ideal, which is to build a community based on norms for cooperation, rather than an order predicated primarily on power calculations”[38]. However, the inherent disunion between more and less developed members countries has inevitably disclosed divergent interests[39], acting as a sword of Damocles hanging over ASEAN consensus. As unanimity prevails as decision-making instrument, member states will be enabled to ensure their national interests, whereas the institution efficacy in proposing laws is constrained by the government’s veto right[40]. Despite the significant legitimacy issued by the consensus, the ASEAN is fundamentally deprived of communitarian instruments having a binding force. As consequence, consensus is not immune from foreign influences, namely the Chinese.

 

 South China-sea conflict

The sovereignty issue around the South China Sea archipelagos has evolved into a significant point of contention between the ASEAN and China, in addition of challenging the regional security pyramid and revealing the difficulties encountered by the organization to build a strong solidarity[41], thus to successfully implement the ASEAN-centrality doctrine. In effect, a territorial conflict opposes the maritime countries of Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia with China. Under the statement that the conflict represents today the “laboratory of the evolution between China and ASEAN”[42], it represents thus an insightful way of measuring the power reconfiguration in Asia.

Some member countries approached the USA through military deliveries or even alliances, in order to exert dissuasion leverage towards China’s strengthened presence in the Sea, which resulting diplomatic polarization has forced China to challenge ASEAN-centrality as being eager to avoid the building of an united front against its interests[43]. The Chinese efforts to contain the territorial conflict solving to bilateral relations induces the Chinese official’s motivation to avoid any multilateral confrontation with the ASEAN, and thus no fundamental willingness to break up ASEAN centrality.  The latter could therefore be strengthened in two different cases. First, if escalating tensions and further diplomatic polarization force China to adopt an aggressive stance, thus bringing to the constitution a strengthened ASEAN security community. Second, by excluding the American factor in the South East Asian affairs and bilaterally negotiate the archipelago’s status  – under ASEAN monitoring – as mean to empower ASEAN-centrality. Our study will analyse the conflict genesis through the Chinese and the ASEAN perspective, while emitting forecasts about potential upcoming trends.

 

 The conflict issue

The South China Sea is composed by 4 disputed archipelagos, whose large set of arid islands are lacking of drinking water, while some of them are even partially submerged, therefore having impeached for long any form of human establishment[44]. Despite the precarious living conditions offered by the islands, 6 Asian States covet them due to the resources they retain, as supposed important oil reserves and fishing resources. As overfishing as considerably reduced the fish populations in coastal areas, the control for larger exploitation zones has become a national concern[45].  While China (RPC) and Taiwan (ROC) extend their claims over the whole archipelagos – Paracels, Spratleys, Pratas, Macclesfield – the 4 other countries included in the disputes have limited their territorial ambitions to zones with direct access to their territorial waters.

The conflict escalated on the aftermath of the Second World War, but remained relatively frozen as the overwhelming claims opted for the status quo during the eighties – excepting scattered skirmish battles – until the Montego Bay United Nations Conventions (1982) adoption, that brought modifications relative to the international Law of the Sea[46]. The adopted juridical corpus served as international law reference in the maritime conflict solving, and played a significant role in the South China Sea conflict from the nineties as the concerned countries ratified it[47], by enhancing the South China Sea economic value. Indeed, the Convention introduced the existence of the Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZ), extending the States jurisdiction area on the sea from 200 nautical miles from the territorial coast, and thus extending their economic opportunities[48]. As the archipelagos sovereignty is today undetermined, there has been no EEZ grating in the disputed zone. Therefore, China is seeking to prove its legitimacy over the zone’s sovereignty and affirm its territorial claims, in order to extend in a second time their maritime space in perfect legality with the international law[49]. The predominance of the territorial contentious in the Chinese rhetoric seems beneficial as it allows the juridical confrontation with the other States, without violating the Convention[50].

Map 2: Claims on the South China Sea [51]

The affirmation effort has been intensified and became a spearhead of China’s today diplomacy. The PRC justifies the claims over the islands by means of a solid historic argumentation, allowed by the plethora of documents produced by the mandarin bureaucracy, according to which the distinct Chinese empires have exerted an administrative authority – or even a politic influence – over the disputed islands; nevertheless the control seems to have adopted fragmented and discontinuous shapes[52]. The documents attest the archipelagos ancient geographical identification, as well as their inclusion in the Chinese concentric domination area; those arguments support today the sovereignty affirmation in China’s perspective.  While the Chinese claim is based on solid and abundant archives, Vietnam and the Philippines face the absence of similar historical documents, and are therefore force to contest the Chinese archive’s interpretation[53].

Through the rise of nationalism among concerned countries, the role of the public opinion has evolved into a performative factor for the tensions escalation. The diverse governments aim to adopt an intransigent stance towards their respective rivals in order to seduce and gain popular support, which considers now the South China Sea conflict as a national concern and is undisposed to sacrifice their intransigent diplomatic posture as it’s perceived a s a question of principle[54]. This underlines the States political goal in the region, namely to be respected and avoid being dispossessed by illegitimate rival’s claims.

 

 America’s back

As the Asian states are engaged in the sovereignty conflict over the South China Sea, the western, Philippine and Vietnamese press exacerbates the idea of an immoderate Chinese expansionism, and tends to reduce the issue to the only military dimension. In such a perspective, China appears as an instability factor, as well as a potential conflict trigger element. And yet, the Chinese gradual interventionism – use of military dissuasion – in the region is highly correlated with the American containment foreign policy, that is not only accused of “making the region less rather than more stable”[55], but also threatening ASEAN centrality through the diplomatic polarization of the region’s powers. In addition, China and ASEAN agree to avoid any conflict escalation through the mutual agreement  Declaration of Conduct ratified in 2002[56], nevertheless with no binding force as result of Beijing’s opposition[57].

In the first instance, Chinese officials expressed sympathy for the “American return“ in Asia, i.e. the intention of the American administration to focus its interest on Asia, which was initiated in 2009 under the presidency of Barack Obama. Indeed, this shift in the US foreign policy was primary perceived as a motivation of strengthening ties with China and Southeast Asia, thus granting the emerging pole with recognition for its growing economic and political significance at the global stage[58]. However, despite that Hu Jintao and Barack Obama’s official meeting in 2009 expressed the necessity of developing a “positive, cooperative and expanded” relationship, the Chinese perception turned out to become gradually suspicious regarding the American’s motivations. China’s suspicion was enhanced by several reasons, namely the publication of a report by the US Department of Defense in 2012, relating the foreign policy priority for the USA as to build an Asia-Pacific security network and contain the Chinese growth[59]. The doctrine has been followed by an effective US military’s presence consolidation, through the establishment of troupes in Australia, Philippines and Thailand, and by reassuring bilateral security treaties with the two first and Japan[60]. In addition, many scholars have described the Trans-Pacific-Partnership (TPP) as the economic dimension of the containment doctrine, as it included Beijing’s rivals such as Japan and Vietnam and other ASEAN-members like Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam[61] that nurture claims towards China.

The enacting of a containment doctrine can be explained by Washington’s concern to preserve the free circulation of goods through the Asian maritime corridors, fundamental for the global trade network and the American supply in resources[62]. The strengthening of the American power in South East Asia is, according to a Washington’s perspective, a way to ensure the region’s security, essential in reason of its strategic significance, supposedly challenged by Beijing’s expansionism. Even if none of China or ASEAN members has any interest in perturbing global trade, the American presence aims to adopt an intransigent stance on this topic[63]. Moreover, the framing of regional cooperation in security terms has enabled the USA to sign military treaties, and therefore to increase their equipment expenditures in the region. For instance, Indonesia’s military expenses growth – launched under a governmental program in 2010 – has been perceived as a juicy opportunity for the arms industries, whose interests are converging with the regional’s escalation tensions.  With the direct American intervention in the South China Sea contentious, the ASEAN states Vietnam and Philippines have adopted a much more aggressive towards China by relying on the “pivot”, and thus alarming Beijing of a potential anti-Chinese consensus among the ASEAN.

The Chinese perspective considers the American engagement in Asia as an unjustified containment policy “specifically targeted against the country’s rise and regional leadership”[64], which exacerbates a conflict potentiality as the American alliance system is blamed for “making the region less rather than more stable”. Beijing felt disgruntled by the American attempt to block its growth, as it was trying to redefine the Sino-American relation’s framework under the mutual benefits and non-confrontation guidelines[65]. Xi Jinping strives notably to establish a form of strategic parity between the two major powers in Asia[66]. China’s strategic manoeuverability in the Sea is seriously constrained by the American aligned States – the so-called pivot – that either share anti-Chinese security concerns like Taiwan, or even host US-basis like Japan and the Okinawa cordon, South Korea and the Philippines. As a matter of fact, Beijing put their efforts in gaining access to the South China Sea, considered as a legitimate Chinese territory, as mean to ensure the trade routes – Malacca Strait – and energy supplying security that are vital for the country’s economic growth[67]. As direct answer to the TPP, China has proposed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which strives to build a free-trade area with the ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. With the recent American withdrawal from the TPP[68], the RCEP has gained a major opportunity of representing Asia’s tomorrow spearhead of the continent’s integration.

 

 ASEAN consensus shutdown

Washington has on several occasions called for South China Sea conflict pacific resolution, underlining the American objection for an oversized military intervention[69], but under a rhetoric that clearly blames Beijing’s claims.  For instance, US state’s secretary Hillary Clinton strongly irritated the Chinese officials during the 17^th ASEAN regional forum in 2010, by adopting a critical stance towards Beijing and bringing support to the ASEAN concerned parties[70]. Moreover, the ASEAN centrality principle founds support from the USA, which perceives the organization as a precious ally in their counterbalancing policy towards China, the Obama administration having notably reassured bilateral security treaties with the Philippines, while increasing military cooperation with Vietnam and Malaysia[71].

Despite the American support for the ASEAN-centrality principle, upcoming tensions escalation will in all-likelihood undermine the organization’s posture at the international stage. Indeed, the regional agenda setting – destined to solve the conflicts – is very likely to be captured by major and minor powers[72], and therefore to cut ASEAN-centrality and influence. The USA and China have held informal bilateral summits to resolve their geopolitical disputes, forming a decisional condominium on Asian affairs without the consultation of ASEAN states[73], thus building a regional border essentially grounded by power calculations. Endangered by diplomatic exclusion, the ASEAN is appealed to pursue a multiplex regional architecture able to defend the ideal of cooperation community, as well as to proactively claim and defend a status of legitimate representation of Southeast Asia interests.

Under the American containment diplomacy, considered by Beijing as a destruction factor of the integration and cooperation trend in Asia, China felt forced to adopt dissuasion policies and military programs, by means of the increase of the Defense’s Budget. Beijing has increased its military capabilities in the South China Sea, through notably the Yongxing Island’s airfield at the Spratley’s archipelago’s core, able to serve as relay for the Chinese fighter jets “Sukhoi SU-30MKK”, in addition to the Hainan Island dissuasive proximity, base of nuclear attack submarines[74]. However, Beijing is more likely to exert dissuasion rather than seek for a frontal confrontation with an ASEAN member. Beijing relies also on “seduction diplomacy” means, as president Xi Jinping multiplies official visits around the concerned countries to upgrade China’s perception among ASEAN members[75].

At several times, Chinese officials have expressed the regional economic cooperation agenda priority, which should remain the main issue of negotiations between the ASEAN and China in place of the maritime conflict[76]. Furthermore, China refuses the multilateral negotiations on the contentious and advocates the prevalence of the bilateral conflict solving, on the purpose of avoiding an anti-Chinese ASEAN joint stance erection[77] as well as the conflict internationalization[78].  The limit of ASEAN consensus has been perceived as an opportunity window by China, in quest of diplomatic allies in the region on the purpose of avoiding an ASEAN anti-Chinese polarization. The latter’s potentiality was relatively high as the ASEAN maritime countries of Vietnam and the Philippines – hosting the US base of Subic Bay[79] – have been strong Chinese competitors, and took a clear advantage of the American pion[80] while nurturing popular anti-Chinese feeling. But recently, Philippine’s president Rodrigo Duterte announced his retreat from the US containment network, and accepted to establish bilateral talks about the contentious with China, thus alleviating the containment network[81].

Among the ASEAN, the foreign policy divergences underlines the difficulty on achieving the organization’s unity as a multilateral instance of conflict solving, as only 4 of the 10 members nurture claims against China. For those reasons, it seems difficult to convince States like Laos and Cambodia, not very interested in the South China Sea, to adopt a consensual mutual position against China, as they expect to galvanize their economic relations with China, which is the major untied-investment donor in Cambodia and Laos[82]. The two countries notably impeached the formulation of a joint ASEAN directive towards China[83], expressing the success of Beijing’s diplomacy. In effect, ASEAN successfully persuaded China to hold a foreign ministers summit in 2012, as multilateral mean to solve the conflict; still confronted to a performative American containment doctrine, resigned Beijing was lacking the bargaining power to impose bilateral talks. The meeting was hold in Kunming, and revealed the Chinese desire of undermining ASEAN’s unity and anti-Chinese consensus, as ASEAN’s diplomats decided to commonly sign a joint statement in opposition to China. Beijing put pressure on Cambodia and Laos, the ASEAN chair, which finally reconsidered to sign the Statement.

The territorial conflict between ASEAN maritime countries and China reveals the resilience of a national interests gap among the association, as well as the weakness of its decisional cores, whose intergovernmental functional mode appears as unable to efficiently overpass divergences[84]. ASEAN centrality is compromised by the division diplomacy operated by China as mean to force its member to adopt Beijing’s preferred stance on the South China Sea. The empowerment of ASEAN centrality will in all likelihood rely on a dynamic equilibrium diplomacy, which supposes the multiplication of bilateral relationships in order to dilute a major power’s rising influence. This policy has been implemented in Indonesia[85], eager to compensate Beijing’s rising grip over the South China Sea and regional meetings. On this purpose, Jakarta gained the East Asia Summit (EAS) enlargement to the USA and Russia. Through equilibrium diplomacy, the organization leadership could be preserved as foreign interferences would get weakened through counterbalance effects, close to the realist motto of “Divide et impera” adovacted by Machiavelli.

 

 Asian economic integration

The ASEAN is destined to play a significant role in the Asian economic integration, as its middle class growth is expected to double by 2025 and reach 125 million households. Some forecasts even predict the upcoming ASEAN’s status upgrade to “consumer center of the whole world” [86]. The ASEAN economic integration is monitored through the organization’s internal free trade institution, as well as through a regional concentric partnerships network, composed by a Free Trade Agreement web that links the organization with all Asia’s major powers, such as China, Japan, South Korea and India[87]. As the organization is currently negotiating the conclusion of FTA’s with the European Union and the USA, the ASEAN economic diplomacy cloud appear as a mean to reach the “ASEAN-centrality” goal, by shaping a regional form of dynamic equilibrium and divide the foreign interferences. For instance, the China Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) which strives to annually invest 100 billion of USD among the ASEAN[88], has been challenged by activities increase of the Japanese Asian Development Bank (ADB) in the region. While China strives for evolving into an inevitable trade hub championing the American liberalization doctrines, Japan is embedded in attempting to compensate its trade deficit through unrestricted production markets in Southeast Asia. In short, ASEAN countries “will become an object of increased investment activity”[89] through regional rivalries.

 In addition, the inherent limits of an ASEAN-led economic integration have constrained its member states to multiply their economic partners and extend the trade network, as the organization lacks sufficient funds for autonomously evolving in tomorrow’s “largest factory of the world” [90]. The Chinese rising influence over the Asia economic integration process will represent all at once a challenge to “ASEAN centrality” and an opportunity for the integration’s success.

 

 Limits of an autonomous ASEAN-led integration

The sporadic economic cooperation among the ASEAN, which reigned until the nineties, has been gradually surpassed by liberalization projects. The most significant and ambitious economic project was the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), advocated by Thailand and signed in 1991. The custom union was crowned by a Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) aiming to promote the free flow of goods between the member states by the trade barriers diminution. The reduction of trade tariffs and the removal of non-tariffs barriers has been perceived as a key achievement for the organization, as a significant step to reach the ASEAN common market[91].

Table 1: ASEAN import structure (2014)[92]

Table 2: ASEAN export structure (2014)[93]

According to Viner’s custom unions theory[94], economic unification should have gradually increased among the ASEAN by spill overs effects. The author claims that the liberalization of exchanges trigger integration processes, and lead to the sequential establishment of CETPT zones, then succeeded by FTA’s, custom unions, common markets – like contemporary European Union – until a complete economic integration. However, ASEAN is less likely to follow a similar trend than the EU’s. The low levels of economic interconnectivity, as well as the high economic inequalities among the member states[95], impeaches an effective ASEAN common market implementation (which theoretically came into force in 2015)[96].  ASEAN countries mainly export substitute goods, such as resources and manufactured items, resulting in low levels of exports within the organization. In effect, while ASEAN intra-trade reaches 25% of it’s total exports, it is comparatively surpassed by more autonomous markets, such as the EU (60%) or NAFTA (33%)[97].

An essential element in reaching the ASEAN cohesion is the infrastructure development. As the transport networks is insufficient to the requirement of an interconnected whole, one ASEAN priority is to implement infrastructure projects as mean to increase the regional connection chains, reduce the transports costs and enhance access to markets[98]. As the limits of an ASEAN-led economic integration restrain the process, the ASEAN diplomacy considers as a priority the increase of transnational infrastructure and investment spending[99], objective readily achievable as foreign investors consider them as a potential well-connected integrated production base. The low prospects of building a self-sufficient and self-centered Southeast Asian market prevent from an enhanced political integration and constrain the association in relying on foreign markets, which in fact has enabled the erection of advantageous dynamic equilibrium diplomacy towards major powers, as well as an opportunity for the ASEAN leaders to consult and commonly promote the region’s attractiveness.

 

 Chinese-led economic integration in Asia

The deep economic and political interdependence between ASEAN and Beijing erects a fundamental statement, namely that the Asian integration project is today unconceivable by excluding one of the two parties. China is actively engaged in infrastructure projects in the region, essentially through the China Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) – whose objective is to invest 100 billion of USD among the ASEAN [100]– and private-led initiatives. China became the largest trade partner of almost all the Asian countries – in 2009 for the ASEAN – and replaced Japan as leader of economic integration[101]. For this reason, Beijing seeks to maintain and enhance its cooperation level with the organization – such as infrastructure spending in Cambodia and Laos[102] – and strictly separate the maritime contentious with economic[103] concerns. The clear separation of the diplomatic activity nurtured with the ASEAN has notably been expressed by former president Deng Xiaoping, which advocated the necessity of  «Putting conflicts aside, pursuing joint development »[104].

Beijing’s economic integration is comprised under the doctrine expressed by president Xi Jinping, the “One Belt One Road“ initiative, striving to transform China into the hub of the global economy[105] by the means of an intercontinental high-speed railways and maritime routes network. With regards to the ASEAN, the OBOR-initiative plans notably the construction of a pan-Asian railway[106].  The increase of China investment in South East Asia is raising concerns about a potential domination of China[107], but the recent economic recession in Japan and American withdrawal from Asia seriously limits the number of potential economic counterbalancing powers. Only remain the European Union and India, which lacking from equivalent interconnectivity and proximity, seem unable to challenge the China’s driven Asian economic integration. However, the establishment of cooperation and multilateral summits between the two trading partners, ASEAN and China, is more likely to redefine the Asian socio-politic space into a multiplex structure of governance, instead of sinking into a hegemonic dominance framework.

 

 Conclusion

The ASEAN and China relationship has revealed to overpass a strict military opposition, which had been exacerbated by the western press, eager to limit Beijing’s affirmation at the global stage. Indeed, the binary vision of ASEAN-China relations limits our comprehension of Asia’s reality, as both entities are oscillating between security concerns and deep multilateral cooperation, if it is not formal regional integration policies. Our study assumes that tomorrow’s Asia is likely to redefine its socio-politic space into a multiplex structure of governance, instead of sinking into a hegemonic dominance framework. In effect, the China-led integration process in Asia doesn’t require the suppression of the ASEAN-centrality doctrine, as it aims to boost the regional interconnectivity through investment and giving a high priority to multilateral talks on upcoming projects. According to the Chinese perspective, the ASEAN can represent a precious regional ally, through which China strives for evolving into a global trade hub and gaining mutual benefits at the Asian scale. Furthermore, China dreams to gain the strategic parity status towards the USA. As Washington perceives the whole American continent as its backyard, Beijing aspires to achieve the building of the Great China in Asia, as mean to become an equivalent indisputable global power.

 However, Beijing is likely to adopt an intransigent stance to any foreign attempt to ruin the Chinese claims in the South China Sea’s archipelagos, in order to maintain the domestic public opinion support and the countries’ international credibility as global power. On this purpose, China will not hesitate in challenging the consensus among the ASEAN.  A direct military confrontation in the region seems very unlikely, as China constrained it’s military means to dissuasion purposes and lead a seduction diplomacy among the ASEAN members. Moreover, the probable American retreat from Asia under Donald Trump’s presidency, as well as the launch of bilateral conflict solving with Philippines, could shift the upcoming diplomatic trend to peaceful talks and multilateral cooperation. In such a situation, ASEAN-centrality could be plentifully empowered, as the organization will endorse the status of regional spearhead of multilateralism and multivectorial diplomacy.

In conclusion, we assume that ASEAN is evolving into a key player in the region, through its complex relationship not only with China, but with all the regional major powers. This induces that the organization could evolve into tomorrow’s global actor, as regional interdependence and Chinese cooperation ties increase.

Adrian Gasser

 

[1] BONIKOWSKA, Malgorzata & RABIEJ, Pavel & TURKOWSKI, Anderzej & TOMANSKI, Rafal. ASEAN is building a common market [online], CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2016, pages 8.

[2] Ibid., page 6.

[3] ROCHE, Yann & ALEXEEVA, Olga. La mer de Chine méridionale : un laboratoire de l’évolution des relations entre la Chine et l’ASEAN [online]. Monde chinois. 2014, pages 111-126.

[4] BEESON, Mark. Can Asia’s alliances still keep the peace? Global Asia. 2014.

[5] TO-HAI, Liou. “Taiwan’s Role in the Enhancing Asia-Europe Economic Interactions”, The Current Issues of Economic and Social Integration in Hungary and Taiwan, Proceeding of the Scientific Conference of Budapest Business School, University of Applied Science. 2016, pages 34.

[6] ASEAN is building a common market [online], CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. 2016, pages 5.

[7] Author’s production with the support of GOOGLE EARTH. URL: https://www.google.com/earth/

[8] SINGARAVÉLOU, Pierre. Les empires coloniaux XIX^e-XX^e siècle. Paris: éditions Points, 2013.

[9] ALLES, Delphine.  Indonésie : le non-alignement à l’épreuve de la concurrence sinoaméricaine [online]. Politique étrangère. 2013, pages 175-185.

[10] BULARD, Martine. Un Chaudron bouillonant, Poudrières asiatiques. Le Monde Diplomatique: Manière de voir. 2015.

[11] Ibid.

[12] KISSINGER, Henry. On China. New York: Penguin Press. 2011.

[13] Ibid.

[14] ASEAN is building a common market [online], CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2016, page 2.

[15] MACLEOD, Alex & DUFAULT, Evelyne & DUFOUR, Guillaume & MORIN, David (Eds.). Relations internationales. Théories et concepts. Montréal : Athéna. 2008

[16] STRATFOR. ASEAN: The Limits of Consensus [online]. 2016, page 2.

[17] KUEBLER, Daniel & DE MAILLARD, Jacques. Analyser les politiques publiques. Grenoble : Presses

universitaires de Grenoble (PUG). 2009, page 29.

[18] CHA, Victor. Powerplay origins of the US alliance system in Asia. International Security. 2010

[19]ALLES, Delphine.  Indonésie : le non-alignement à l’épreuve de la concurrence sinoaméricaine [online]. Politique étrangère. 2013, pages 175-185.

[20] ALLES, Delphine.  Indonésie : le non-alignement à l’épreuve de la concurrence sinoaméricaine [online]. Politique étrangère. 2013, pages 175-185.

[21] PORTER, Michael & NEO, Boon Sion & KETELS, Christian. Remaking Singapore. Harvard Business School. 2013, page 6.

[22] AIR FORCE HISTORICAL RESEARCH AGENCY, Thirteenth Air Force (Air Forces Pacific) (PACAF), [online]. 2011.

[23] DEUTSCH, Karl Wolfgang. Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton : Princeton University Press. 1957, page 65-69.

[24] STRATFOR. ASEAN: The Limits of Consensus, 2016, page 3.

[25] Ibid.

[26] ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS. The ASEAN Charter [online]. 2008, page 5.

[27] SINGAPORE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (SIIA). ASEAN Centrality In The Regional Architecture. 2015, pages 2.

[28] SINGAPORE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (SIIA). ASEAN Centrality In The Regional Architecture. 2015, pages 3.

[29] ALLES, Delphine.  Indonésie : le non-alignement à l’épreuve de la concurrence sinoaméricaine [online]. Politique étrangère. 2013, pages 175-185.

[30] Ibid., page 2.

[31] STRATFOR. ASEAN: The Limits of Consensus, 2016, page 2.

[32] ASEAN is building a common market [online], CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2016, page 7.

[33] Ibid.

[34] DARMONDO, Juanita Amanda. ASEAN’s diplomatic strategy after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library. 1987

[35] Ibid., page 3.

[36] Ibid., page 2.

[37] SINGAPORE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (SIIA). ASEAN Centrality In The Regional Architecture. 2015, pages 3.

[38] SINGAPORE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (SIIA). ASEAN Centrality In The Regional Architecture. 2015, pages 8.

[39] ASEAN is building a common market [online], CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2016, page 7.

[40] SCHARPF, Fritz. La diversité légitime : nouveau défi de l’intégration européenne, Revue française de science politique. 2002, pages 609-639.

[41] ROCHE, Yann & ALEXEEVA, Olga. La mer de Chine méridionale : un laboratoire de l’évolution des relations entre la Chine et l’ASEAN. 2014, page 111.

[42] Ibid., page 111.

[43] Ibid., page 111.

[44] Ibid., page 111.

[45] Ibid., page 115-116.

[46] UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, Agreement Relating To The Implementation Of Part Xi Of The Convention (Full texts) [online]. 1982.

[47] [comm.] Philippines (1984), Vietnam (1994), PRC (1996), Malaysia (1996), Taiwan and USA (not)

[48] ROCHE, Yann & ALEXEEVA, Olga. La mer de Chine méridionale : un laboratoire de l’évolution des relations entre la Chine et l’ASEAN. 2014, pages 119.

[49] Ibid., page 119.

[50] Ibid., page 120.

[51] BUSINESS INSIDER, URL : http://static2.businessinsider.com/image/5302aa66ecad04864ebfe96b-1200-/spratly.jpg.

[52] ROCHE, Yann & ALEXEEVA, Olga. La mer de Chine méridionale : un laboratoire de l’évolution des relations entre la Chine et l’ASEAN. 2014, pages 118.

[53] Ibid., page 118.

[54] Ibid., page 116.

[55] SINGAPORE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (SIIA). ASEAN Centrality In The Regional Architecture. 2015, pages 5.

[56] Ibid., page 120.

[57] Ibid., page 184.

[58] XINBO, Wu. Ne pas reculer : la réponse chinoise au rééquilibrage américain en Asie [online]. Monde chinois. 2014, page 67.

[59] DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense [online]. 2012, page 2.

[60] (2014) US forming new security alliance in Asia-Pacific, The Philippine Star, 25 May 2014, [Online], Available: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2014/05/25/1327015/us-forming-new-security-alliance-asia-pacific Retrieved: 9 December 2014.

[61] XINBO, Wu. Ne pas reculer : la réponse chinoise au rééquilibrage américain en Asie [online]. Monde chinois. 2014, page 68.

[62] ROCHE, Yann, La Mer de Chine méridionale: un enjeu frontalier majeur en Asie du Sud-Est. L’Espace Politique [online]. 2013.

[63] ROCHE, Yann & ALEXEEVA, Olga. La mer de Chine méridionale : un laboratoire de l’évolution des relations entre la Chine et l’ASEAN. 2014, pages 121.

[64] BEESON, Mark. Can Asia’s alliances still keep the peace? . Global Asia. 2014, pages 100-106.

[65] Ibid., page 68.

[66] Ibid., page 124.

[67] ALLES, Delphine.  Indonésie : le non-alignement à l’épreuve de la concurrence sinoaméricaine [online]. Politique étrangère. 2013, pages 178.

[68] THE INDIAN EXPRESS. Trump pulls US out of Pacific trade deal, loosening Asia ties. [online]. January 24, 2017.

[69] ROCHE, Yann & ALEXEEVA, Olga. La mer de Chine méridionale : un laboratoire de l’évolution des relations entre la Chine et l’ASEAN. 2014, pages 121.

[70] Ibid., page 122.

[71] SINGAPORE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (SIIA). ASEAN Centrality In The Regional Architecture. 2015, pages 5.

[72] Ibid., page 6.

[73] Ibid., page 8.

[74] Ibid., page 124.

[75] ALLES, Delphine.  Indonésie : le non-alignement à l’épreuve de la concurrence sinoaméricaine [online]. Politique étrangère. 2013, pages 180.

[76] XINBO, Wu. Ne pas reculer : la réponse chinoise au rééquilibrage américain en Asie [online]. Monde chinois. 2014, page 69.

[77] ROCHE, Yann & ALEXEEVA, Olga. La mer de Chine méridionale : un laboratoire de l’évolution des relations entre la Chine et l’ASEAN. 2014, pages 123.

[78] Ibid., page 184.

[79] ASEAN is building a common market [online], CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2016, page 8.

[80] Ibid., page 68-69.

[81] CNN. In China, Duterte announces split with US: ‘America has lost’. [online]. October 20, 2016.

[82] STRATFOR. Cambodia Benefits from Rivalry in the Region [online]. 2012.

[83] PARAMESWARAN, Prashanth. What Really Happened at the ASEAN-China Special Kunming Meeting, The Diplomat [online]. 2016.

[84] SCHARPF, Fritz. La diversité légitime : nouveau défi de l’intégration européenne, Revue française de science politique. 2002, pages 609-639.

[85] ALLES, Delphine.  Indonésie : le non-alignement à l’épreuve de la concurrence sinoaméricaine [online]. Politique étrangère. 2013, pages 184-185.

[86] [comm] household with an annual income of at least 7,500 USD. ASEAN is building a common market [online], CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2016, page 6.

[87] [comm] ASEAN + 6 is an undertaken initiative aiming to build a free trade and intergovernmentalcooperation framework between the ASEAN, China, japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand. Ibid. .

[88] Ibid., page 5.

[89] Ibid., page 5.

[90] Ibid., page 5.

[91] Ibid., page 4.

[92] THE OBSERVATORY OF ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY, Countries [online]. 2014.

[93] Ibid.

[94] VINER, Jacob. The Custom Union issue. Londres: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950.

[95] ASEAN is building a common market [online], CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2016, page 7.

[96] STRATFOR. ASEAN: The Limits of Consensus. 2016, page 3.

[97] Ibid., page 3.

[98] Ibid., page 4.

[99] Ibid., page 4.

[100] Ibid., page 5.

[101] TO-HAI, Liou. Taiwan’s Role in the Enhancing Asia-Europe Economic Interactions. 2016, pages 34.

[102] STRATFOR. Cambodia Benefits from Rivalry in the Region [online]. 2012.

[103] ROCHE, Yann & ALEXEEVA, Olga. La mer de Chine méridionale : un laboratoire de l’évolution des relations entre la Chine et l’ASEAN. 2014, pages 122

[104] KLEINE-AHLBRANDT, Stephanie. Guerre des nationalismes en mer de Chine [online]. Le Monde diplomatique. 2012

[105] TO-HAI, Liou. Taiwan’s Role in the Enhancing Asia-Europe Economic Interactions. 2016, pages 35.

[106] Ibid.,  page 35.

[107] ASEAN is building a common market [online], CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2016, page 3.

Tableau du titre : Tourbillon, Véronique Roche (2015). Painting realized as part of the « Le Cercle au Carré », a collective art exhibiton in Paris.

 

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